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The Institutional Life
Darian Meacham, University of the West of England
Some ten years ago I read for the first time the passage from which this contribution 
draws its title. It marks, for me, something like the beginning of an obsession—but 
one that only takes me in circles, back to those lines, where I find comfort alongside a 
certain sense of futility in a passage that I know I will never fully unravel. In this  
futile return there is a feeling of coming home, but also of a continuous departure 
which most often leads down familiar paths—all of them leading back to where I 
started—but also sometimes yielding a new route to travel both vainly, in the hope of 
a new discovery, and of course in vain, as these new paths always seem to take me 
back home; if I’m lucky a home that is somewhat altered, not necessarily rendered 
more or less clear to me but somehow deepened, given an added depth or dimension. 
But  each  departure  is  nonetheless  accompanied  by  a  marvelous  sensation  of 
quickening, a nervousness or jitteriness that pushes me to literally move, to get up 
from my desk and pace nervously, a sort of push that must be redirected back into the 
text from which it emerged.     
Trying to trace back one of these paths, in search of that little push, I realize 
that I had in fact been well prepared for these few lines of text that I now speak of. At 
the risk of sounding entirely cliché—although, in a sense, the possible variants of the 
experience of cliché are exactly what is at stake here—I had, without being aware of 
it, been looking for them. But in order to look for something, we must in some sense 
already have it, the ground must be prepared for the search and to prepare this ground 
is somehow to already sketch out or even know what one is looking for; otherwise 
‘looking for something’ loses its sense. And, on the other hand, what I search for in a 
short passage, read over and over, must continuously elude me in order for there to be 
a search. Not just elude in the sense that I never quite grasp what I am searching for,  
but that I am even unsure what it is that I am looking for, but that I nonetheless feel 
prepared for in some way. As Merleau-Ponty wrote, ‘What one too deliberately seeks, 
he does not find; and he who on the contrary has in his meditative life known how to  
tap its spontaneous source never lacks for ideas and values’.1  The lines that I have 
grown obsessed with present themselves to me as a sort of response to a question, but 
a question I have never been able to definitively articulate. And, rather than providing 
an answer of some sort or another, they only seem to compound the question; and 
nonetheless I return to them in search of that feeling of moving closer to something 
that  I  can’t  put  my finger  on and that  continuously deepens  itself.  It  is  this  ever 
realized  threat  of  the  question  continuously  expanding  that  I  think  propels  the 
movement out of my chair, the nervous pacing. This physical movement serves as an 
effort to redirect or even halt for a moment that other movement, that of the question, 
which seems to indefinitely develop or deepen itself.
    
In terms of the general experience that I  am trying to provide some pallid 
description of, the factual contingencies are perhaps of little matter—presuming that 
this experience is to some degree a common one, my ‘little phrase’ is particular to me. 
In  this  context,  however—a  festschrift—the  particular  little  phrase  is  perhaps 
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everything. The lines that I have in mind here come from an essay by Merleau-Ponty, 
‘Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence’. In this essay, published in 1960 and 
dedicated to his friend Sartre, Merleau-Ponty refers to Husserl in taking up a term that 
permeates nearly all of the French phenomenologist’s period at the Collège de France up to his untimely death: Stiftung. He writes: 
Husserl has used the fine word Stiftung—foundation or establishment—to 
designate  first  of  all  the  unlimited  fecundity  of  each  present  which, 
precisely because it is singular and passes, can never stop having been and 
thus being universally;  but above all  to designate that fecundity of the 
products of a culture which continue to have value after their appearance 
and which open a field of investigations in which they perpetually come to 
life  again.  It  is  thus that  the world as soon as he has seen it,  his  first 
attempts  at  painting,  and  the  whole  past  of  painting  all  deliver  up  a 
tradition to  the  painter—that  is,  Husserl  remarks,  the  power  to  forget  
origins and to give the past not a survival, which is the hypocritical form 
of forgetfulness, but a new life, which is the noble form of memory. […] It 
is accomplishment and brotherhood.2    
Husserl’s fine word, Stiftung, is also rendered by Merleau-Ponty as ‘institution’, and I 
will use that translation here. An institution is a sense development that opens a field 
of investigation and thus can be described as a question. As that field develops, as the 
original  sense  of  the  question  transforms  and  opens  onto  ever  new  fields  of 
investigation it turns and refers-back to itself. In the passage above, painting is offered 
as an example. For the painter, the perceptual world immediately offers itself up as a 
question to be responded to by the painter. But in appearing as such, the world, in its 
appearance to the painter, refers back to a tradition, to the question as it was posed to 
countless other  painters,  and to  their  responses.  Merleau-Ponty tries  to clarify the 
mode of existence of the institution qua question in saying: ‘The mode of existence of 
the  question,  like  that  of  the  answer,  is  not  psychological.  It  is  not  a  state  of 
consciousness  (anxiety)  and  it  is  not  an  object  of  consciousness.  The  mode  of 
existence of the question and answer are dimensions of a field, dimensions in which 
all of what is lived is distributed, but which are not lived for themselves.’3 It is this 
‘dimensionalising’ of the question or of the sense developments that form a tradition 
that presents itself as a question, that I think to some extent explains or at least points 
the way toward an explanation of the ‘little push’ that I tried to describe above, the, 
for lack of a better word, jitteriness. It is a result of a participation in a development or 
movement of sense that cannot be grasped as a state or object of my consciousness, 
but as a dimension ‘in which all of what is lived is distributed’. Merleau-Ponty tries in 
many places to describe what he means here by dimension and in my opinion never 
fully succeeds. But one of his more successful metaphors—which appears the essay 
on politics and history,  ‘The Crisis of the Understanding’—is of a ‘line of force’; 
something  akin  to  an  axis  along  which  life—and  in  the  case  of  human  beings, 
conscious life—moves,  or a pole toward which life’s movement is  drawn without 
consciousness being able to grasp the axis or pole as an object, act, or state. It remains 
to try to develop the ideas of dimension, movement, and life in relation to institution.  
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Returning to my personal history of obsession and jitteriness, the particular 
details  become  relevant  here.  It  was  of  course  Rudolf  Bernet  who,  upon  my 
expressing a desire to write a PhD on the politics and phenomenology of memory, 
suggested the essay that the passage cited above is taken from. But I think it is fair to 
say that the ground for my attachment to these lines had already been long prepared. 
As an undergraduate student, my first encounter with phenomenology had come with 
reading Husserl’s lectures  On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal  
Time in a course taught by Philip Buckley, who had also been a student of Rudolf 
Bernet.  It  is  in  these lectures that the building blocks of Husserl’s  theory of time 
consciousness—retention,  recollection,  protention—are  laid.4  It  is  also  in  these 
lectures  that  Merleau-Ponty locates  the  development  of  what  he calls  a  theory of 
‘“latent” constitution’ in Husserl’s thought, which proved to be so important to all of 
Merleau-Ponty’s  thought,  while  having  remained  an  ‘embarrassment’ to  Husserl.5 
And, it was these ideas that first drew me into the abyss of the problem of memory, 
from which  I  have,  happily,  never  fully  re-emerged.  A problem that  clearly  runs 
through passage  cited  above with  its  references  to  a  hypocritical  forgetting  and a 
noble memory.  The ideas worked out by Husserl in these lectures, in turn, form the 
foundation of his later genetic theory of constitution and phenomenology of history, 
expressed through concepts such as sedimentation, Rückfrage, and Stiftung; ideas that 
left a great impression on Merleau-Ponty and on the basis of which his own final 
project,  to  articulate  the relations  and interdependence between  φύσις,  λόγος,  and 
history,  finds  its  axis.  In  other  words,  Husserl  lectures  on  time  consciousness 
functioned as an institution—‘a past which creates a question’—that Merleau-Ponty 
himself took up and which gave a dimension to his later thought; the most powerful 
line of force, I think, that runs through his field of investigation. My finding of this 
passage, and subsequent ‘obsession’ with it had already been ‘dimensionalised’—for 
lack of a better word—by Philip Buckley and Rudolf Bernet. Rudolf Bernet’s own 
field of investigation, the question he himself responds to had, in a sense, given this 
text a dimension for me, prepared me for it,  and most likely many others.  Put in 
distinctly  ‘Merleau-Pontian’ terms,  the  future  of  my  obsession—with  the  idea  of 
institution—is  the  ‘deepening’  of  a  past  that  I  did  not  constitute,  but  whose 
movement, whose life, I nonetheless, happily, find myself within. 
 
I relate this story not out of a desire to tie my own private history together with 
those of scholars I admire, never mind Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, but rather to try to 
illustrate a point about institution.  Husserl,  as Merleau-Ponty points out,  uses this 
term to describe the movement of sense.  Stiftung is  a way of explaining how the 
products  of  a  field  of  culture—and  here  we  must  include  subjects,  themselves 
institutions—open onto a potentially limitless number of other fields of investigation. 
But  also  how these  other  fields  of  investigation  refer  back  to  their  origins  (their 
Urstiftungen) while simultaneously ‘forgetting’ them. I did not find the little phrase 
that I cite above pristine and untouched, waiting for me to pick up, but rather, in my 
case, already worked over by its own origins in Husserl’s phenomenology of time 
consciousness and by the projects and investigations of my teachers. It is in this sense 
that cultural products, including other subjects, become ‘dimensions’ of individual’s 
lives—lines  of  force  around  which  a  history  is  instituted—and  the  index  of  our 
participation in a life that extends far beyond and encompasses our own. 
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This, for Merleau-Ponty, is the institutional life of sense and of subjects, a vast 
network of interdependent fields of investigation that continuously refer back upon 
each other, and can only move forward insofar as they do so. But it is clear to see that 
the term ‘life’ is being used in two if not three senses here, none of which can be 
easily separated from the other two. There is, first of all, the life of the institution, 
understood as a cultural object or in a broader sense as a tradition. This is a public and 
historical life, one that members of a community, to some extent, all participate in, 
often without having any consciousness of their participation. There is, in the second 
instance, the life of consciousness that takes up the life of the institution and I think 
we can say resides within it while also nourishing it. The two live in a relation of 
complete interdependence, there is no life of institutions without the conscious lives 
that take up and transform them—in other words, that live them. Also, as Husserl 
explains in Ideas II, the constituting life of consciousness is itself subject to the laws 
of  institution,  constantly referring back upon its  sedimented  background—its  own 
subjective tradition—in its constituting activity. Finally, there is the biological life of 
my  body  as  lived.  The  life  that  feels  the  little  push  and  jitteriness  as  the  body 
‘participates’ in the other two senses of life mentioned above: the life of the body that 
gets up and moves around. Merleau-Ponty, as early as Phenomenology of Perception 
already starts to collapse the distinctions between these forms of life, perhaps most 
clearly  in  referring  to  the  body  of  the  other  as  the  first  cultural  object  (read: 
institution)  and  in  doing  so  quite  clearly  collapsing  the  distinction  between  the 
empirical and ideal.6  It is the idea of institution—Husserl’s fine word—as a kind of 
movement that joins together these three senses of life, and perhaps at also joins these 
three  senses  of  human  life  with  all  other  life.  Put  simply,  I  contend  that  life  is 
institutional and must be understood and described as such in all of its aspects. 
I think that Merleau-Ponty’s main contribution to Husserl’s idea of Stiftung is 
to broaden and radicalise it, first of all by focusing on the latent or virtual aspects of 
this movement, the ‘unsaid’ of the movement of sense, and second by trying to think 
about how this unsaid manifests itself in the movement of the subject, yet outside of 
the subjective power of constitution (his answer is, I think, as a ‘style’, ‘watermark’, 
or ‘in filigree’).7  
In its most radical form, this attempt to think the movement of sense outside of 
the  power  of  subjective  constitution  leads  Merleau-Ponty  to  conclude  that  it  is 
necessary to take up—phenomenologically—precisely what Husserl brackets out: the 
concrete  relation  between  the  ‘realist-causal  order’ and  the  ‘idealist-constituting 
order’.8  Investigating  the  relation  between  these  two  orders,  or  ‘two  aspects  of 
Being’,  is also where Merleau-Ponty seemed to be headed in the series of lecture 
courses from the  Collège de France,  published under the title  Nature.  And, in the 
descriptions  and  analyses  of  Jacob  von  Uexküll’s  ‘phenomenological’ theoretical 
biology of  Umwelten that we find in these courses, Merleau-Ponty makes a rather 
striking  comment:  ‘Consciousness  must  appear  as  an  institution,  as  a  type  of 
behaviour.  Behaviour  includes  elementary  organization  (embryology),  and 
physiological instinctive organization, or behaviour properly called.’9  Seemingly, in 
one  fell  swoop,  Merleau-Ponty  uses  the  concept  of  institution  to  collapse  the 
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distinction between ‘realist-causal’ and ‘idealist-constituting’ orders. By doing so, he 
brings  the  organization  of  organic  matter  of  embryology,  the  emergence  of 
consciousness in the animal world (of which humans are a part), and the movement of 
sense  or  ideas  that  constitute  a  tradition  into  one  single  history  and  one  single 
movement:  the movement of  life  as  institution.  The organization  of  matter  in  the 
development of the embryo and the handing down of historical meaning in a tradition 
of literature, painting, or philosophy must be thought as aspects—dimensions—of this 
same movement. 
What Merleau-Ponty uncovered with his realisation that consciousness must 
appear as an institution, and all that that entails, is a ‘type of being other than the one 
where what we call “matter,” “spirit,” and reason reside. We are in contact with this 
type of being through our science and our private and public lives. But it does not 
have official existence: our “philosophical” thought remains spiritualist, materialist, 
rationalist  or  irrationalist,  idealist  or  realist  […]’.10 This  ‘type  of  being’  the 
characterisation of which is nothing other than the final project Merleau-Ponty sets 
out for himself, is the ‘mode of existence of the institution’.
 
According to this analysis, the constituting life of consciousness presupposes 
an institution that is prior to its own powers and possibilities, a movement of sense 
that precedes consciousness and constitution, and that they emerge out of, in both an 
ontological  and  an  empirical  sense.  It  is  in  the  lectures  on  Husserl’s  ‘Origin  of 
Geometry’,  given  around  a  year  later,  that  Merleau-Ponty  pushes  this  conclusion 
further  by calling constituting subjectivity an  eminent  case of  idealisation.11  The 
subject  is  accordingly instituted  in  a  movement  and a  history that  is  prior  to  its 
emergence: a life-history. To give the question a Schellingian twist, we could say that 
what Merleau-Ponty’s theory of institution demands or would seek to be is a ‘natural 
history of the mind’.12  But this begs the question that Merleau-Ponty himself asks in 
his lectures on Schelling: ‘how do we represent the sense that permeates living beings 
but is not thought as a sense should be?’13
 
I must nonetheless admit that at first glance my formulation of these problems 
perhaps seems to do some violence to Merleau-Ponty’s own intentions. It seems that 
he is quite clear in these same lectures that the instituted and the natural must be 
thought  apart  from one another.  In  the introduction to  his  1956-57 course on the 
concept  of  Nature,  Merleau-Ponty  describes  Nature  as  the  ‘autoproduction  of  a 
meaning’ that is not instituted.14  Two comments can be made here: saying that nature 
is the non-instituted is not to say that the life that springs from nature is not instituted 
or instituting. Indeed, it is not only the reference to the institution of consciousness 
which supports  this  reading,  but  also the many remarks  made about  institution in 
animal life in the Institution and Passivity lectures, and the reference to a species of 
‘preculture’ within ‘Nature’ that defines the ‘unfurling’ of an animal Umwelt. We need 
not  read the claim that nature is  the non-instituted as saying that all  institution is 
human institution. The principle of Nature can then be understood as the ‘Abgrund’ or 
‘Urstiftung’ from which the institution of life emerges as a history, but which only 
refers  back  on  itself  and  that  does  not  emerge  out  of  another  institution.15  It 
nonetheless retains the character of an institution without being instituted. This is why 
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Merleau-Ponty speaks approvingly of Schelling’s conception of Nature as weight and 
inertia, and elsewhere as myth or a dream.16  This also fits with the understanding that 
he offers in relation to culture and tradition, a fecundity (or ‘productivity’) that can 
never stop having been. And with the definition of myth in the Working Notes of The 
Visible and the Invisible as a past that has never been present but nonetheless weighs 
unrelentingly on  the  present.  It  is,  Merleau-Ponty says,  in  its  weight  that  we are 
interested  in  nature.  He  writes:  ‘Nature  does  not  interest  us  for  itself,  nor  as  a 
universal  principle  of  explication,  but  as  an  index  of  what,  in  things,  resists  the 
operation of subjective freedom and as concrete access to the ontological problem.’17 
The ideas of weight, inertia, and resistance here are revealing. Merleau-Ponty later 
applies the idea of inertia to life, but it is the same inertia, the re-institution of Nature 
as weight and inertia.18  Life is set out against a horizon of Nature, and carries with it 
its initial institution of resistance and inertia. Likewise the human as an individuation 
and institution in the history of life stands out against the horizons of life and nature, 
whose institutions the human always carries, as the painter carries the weight of a 
tradition, but also the weight of the nature, and as each individual human carries the 
weight of the dimension or humanity, which manifests itself in filigree. As Merleau-
Ponty writes: ‘The concern is to grasp humanity first as another manner of being a 
body—to see humanity emerges just like Being in the manner of a watermark’.19  It 
also  seems  appropriate  here  to  point  to  a  passage  that  I  cannot  claim  to  fully 
understand, but which I sense conveys the meaning that I am after and also seems to 
connect an ontology of matter or mass with the being of the institution, in other words 
the  ‘realist-causal  order’  and  the  ‘idealist-constituting  order’.  Just  prior  to  the 
comment about humanity appearing as a watermark, Merleau-Ponty says: 
Alltäglichkeit is always in the in-between world, always as a watermark, 
accessible to a thinking that sees the organism or the species as a reality of 
mass  (there  are  two  kinds  of  reality  of  mass:  one  is  that  of  random 
statistical  distribution,  an  entropic  phenomenon;  the  other  is  that  of 
counter  random  distribution  not  going  toward  equalization  and 
abatement), instead of trying to squeeze it in the pincers of fragmentary 
events.20  
It  was  Cézanne  who  Merleau-Ponty  says—in  trying  to  paint  ‘a  piece  of 
Nature’—endeavoured  to  paint  this  initial  weight,  resistance,  and  inertia—or  put 
better,  the  reinstitution  of  this  weight,  resistance,  and inertia  in  the  movement  of 
human perception. And, it is, in this sense, Cézanne (among others) who attempted to 
respond to Schelling’s question of how to represent that sense—the inertia of this 
original  institution of  nature—that  permeates  life,  that  all  life  and thus  all  human 
seeing refers back to as its origin.
 
The mode of existence of Nature in human perception is not just an inertia or 
resistance, that the painter is alert to, but also, it is the being of a question that that the 
painter takes up and responds to, in Cézanne’s case by trying to paint the question 
itself. This response, we are inclined to say, is the movement of life at its fullest, but it 
carries with it the Ur-institution of nature, its weight, but also the weight of an entire 
history of life, and cannot but continuously refer back to it as it takes up this weight as 
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a question only to re-pose it. We can thus see that the question of life does not replace 
the question of Nature, even if it is, I think, life that comes to the fore in the so-called 
Nature lectures. But this is only fitting. In his heretical manner, Merleau-Ponty tries to 
remain  loyal  to  Husserl  to  the  end.  His  methodology  remains  that  of  the 
phenomenological  Rückfrage that  Husserl  expounds  in  the  Crisis,  but  Merleau-
Ponty’s back-referencing or back-questioning—tracing back the being of the question 
that is cultural historical life—does not lead him to constituting subjectivity, or rather 
it leads him past constituting subjectivity, which as we saw must be considered a case 
of idealisation. It leads him past the institution of consciousness as another institution 
in the movement of life and into the preculture of animal life. The  Rückfrage that 
reveals life as an institutional history and in doing so is forced to take up the concrete 
relations between the two orders of being—realist-causal and idealist-constituting—
also reveals the mode of existence of nature, as a resistance, inertia, or weight that 
appears and is referred back to in all of life’s institutions, and thus as a question. It is  
this question that is reinstituted even in the example from which I started, the little 
phrase that is a part of my own institutional history, but in its continuous evasion of 
my albeit lacking subjective powers shows the watermark of Nature as ‘Urstiftung’ or 
the ‘Abgrund’ that evades all constituting reason.          
In  the  Structure of  Behaviour,  Merleau-Ponty announces  his  project  in  the 
following manner: ‘Our goal is to understand the relations between consciousness and 
nature:  organic,  psychological,  or  even  social.  By  Nature  we  understand  here  a 
multiplicity of events bound by relations of causation.’ I think that the goal of the 
latter  project,  with  regard  to  life,  can  be  rephrased  in  the  following  manner:  to 
understand the relations between consciousness and  life:  organic, psychological, or 
even social. By Life we understand here a multiplicity of events bound by relations of 
institution. I can refer again to a passage from the nature lectures to try to support this  
claim: ‘In brief, the distinction between the physicochemical and life = a distinction 
between the ontic and the ontological, between the series of individual spatiotemporal 
facts at a unique local and the architectonic, between the Urstiftung of “foundations” 
which, as in mythical thinking, are always before the everyday and the empirical.’21 
But by doing so and by remaining steadfast in the adherence to the phenomenological 
Rückfrage as a tracing back of institutional history, Nature shows itself—in filigree.
 
We must not forget however that the passage from which I started—‘Husserl 
has used the fine word...’—also contains an important ethical and finally political 
dimension. If  it  is  life  that  binds us to  other living beings  (both human and non-
human), then it is of its proper essence that it contain an ethical dimension. But this 
must then be an ethics and a politics that are in deep kinship, if not grounded, in a 
concept of life that is not separate from biological life. It must also be the case that the 
rapport with the  Urstiftung of Nature, in terms of the appearance of its weight and 
inertia, which emerges out of the phenomenological Rückfrage and is appealed for by 
the movement of life itself, has an ethical and finally a political significance. There is 
no  surprise  here  really.  Merleau-Ponty’s  development  of  the  ethical-political 
dimension of the Stiftung of Nature and its ensuing life history again echoes Husserl’s 
own development of the historical-political dimensions of the concepts of institution, 
sedimentation,  and  crisis.  In  §15  of  the  Crisis,  Husserl  describes  the  ‘task’ of 
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phenomenology as being its own proper activity—the activity of phenomenology is 
its own proper task. Thus, the properly historical task of phenomenology must now be 
construed as engaging in a rigorous tracing back or Rückfrage of its own development 
qua science: phenomenologically analysing the movement of sense from the Greek 
Urstiftung of the European sciences to phenomenology itself as a re-institution of that 
original  Greek  ‘foundation’ or  institution  of  science,  both  in  terms  of  a  practical 
exercise and as a collective way of life that would or should guide a civilisation in its 
development. 
In  fulfilling  this  task,  phenomenology  addresses  the  four-dimensional 
‘forgetting’ that lies at the heart of the Crisis of the European Sciences: The forgetting 
of  the  lebenswelt as  the  boden or  soil  of  the  natural  sciences;  the  forgetting  of 
transcendental subjectivity as the constituting Grund of the Lebenswelt; the obscuring 
of the Ancient Greek Urstiftung of the European sciences by their own success and 
accomplishments; and finally, the covering over of the movement of institution—its 
continuous back-referencing and opening of new horizons—by its own idealities. As 
Merleau-Ponty pointed out, it is the movement of institution’s own proper power to 
forget its origins. But, it is the calling of phenomenology to engage in their retracing 
and hence re-institution, which keeps the tradition vital and alive to its own latent 
possibilities. 
Approached  in  this  manner,  the  ‘noble  memory’  or  ethical  ‘virtue’  that 
Merleau-Ponty brings up repeatedly in ‘Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence’ 
is nothing other than the activity of phenomenology itself. Merleau-Ponty affirms his 
‘Husserlian’ position in the 1958 ‘La philosophie aujourd’hui’ lectures in a number of 
ways, but also indicates his departures from it. It is important to be clear that for both 
thinkers the ‘forgetting’ that has brought about the crisis is not a possible danger or 
risk of science-civilisation-history, brought about by its abuse or improper practice. To 
the contrary, crisis is in a certain sense the natural (in both phenomenological—i.e. 
‘natural’ attitude and world—and the mundane—i.e. ‘normal’—senses of the word) 
outcome of the institutional movement of sense. For example, what Husserl calls the 
‘seduction of writing’,  i.e.  the written codification of ideality,  hence obscuring its 
origins  in  the  Lebenswelt and communities  of  communicating  subjects,  is  not  the 
result of bad scientific practice, but belongs to the essence of writing itself, with all 
the ‘positive’ things that writing also brings. This, Merleau-Ponty tells his students, is 
the  price  of  stability  and  progress.22  The  big  Crisis,  the  one  that  threatens  the 
European  Sciences,  rather  than  facilitating  their  development,  is  when  science  or 
civilisation  shows itself  to  be  unable  to  overcome the  ‘naturally’ occurring  small 
crises: when it fails in its capacity to move past the seduction stage of its relation with 
its  own  idealities.  It  is  a  failure  to  remember  its  own  forgetting—the  ‘noble 
memory’—that threatens its sciences’ internal scope of development and freedom, and 
likewise  European  civilisation  itself.  It  is  in  this  way  that  forgetting  becomes 
‘hypocritical’. It is Merleau-Ponty who continuously reminds his students and readers 
that it is a deepening, the further dimensionalising of the relation with the past that 
opens  more  latent  possibilities  of  future  development  and  is  thus  the  structural 
condition of possibility of freedom.23  This deepening of the relation to the past, in the 
service  of  freedom,  is  of  course  conceived  via  the  properly  historical  work  of 
phenomenology, i.e. the method of the Rückfrage.
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Perhaps not surprisingly, Merleau-Ponty is rather selective about what he takes 
over  from Husserl  and  what  he  leaves  behind.  In  terms  of  the  four-dimensional 
‘forgetting’ discussed above, it is no shock that the focus for Merleau-Ponty is on the 
Natural  Boden of  science  and tradition  and the movement  of  institution,  in  short, 
history, as the movement of and out of this  Boden. The constituting activity of the 
transcendental subject is integrated into a more holistic institutional movement of life 
in  which  the  emergence  of  the  conscious  constituting  subject,  and  hence  each 
emergence  of  a  subject,  carries  with  it  an  institutional  history.  Merleau-Ponty’s 
investigations into animal behaviour and instinct as forms of institution in both the 
Institution  and  Passivity and  Nature lectures  are  precisely  the  Rückfrage of  this 
‘matrix institution’ of the emergence of consciousness.24  The back-questioning that is 
the task of phenomenology and its response to the Crisis of European civilisation is 
transformed here from the uncovering of transcendental subjectivity as the ground of 
the Lebenswelt and of the activity of science that emerges out of the Lebenswelt to the 
making  present  for  phenomenological  investigation  the  weight  and  inertia  of  the 
Urstiftung of Nature as it is felt throughout the entire institutional history of life. 
Given the ethical-political dimensions of the question of institution, and its 
relation to the problem of freedom, it is not at all surprising then that at the same time 
as his lectures on institution and passivity Merleau-Ponty was also concerning himself 
with institutions of the much more concrete kind, namely those of liberal democracy, 
i.e.  parliament  and  rights.  He  even  credits  Husserl’s  theory  of  institution  with 
recovering  the  idea  of  revolution,  writing  in  the  institution  lectures  that  ‘Husserl 
recuperates here the sense of Permanent Revolution: the anticipation of the future in 
the total past and in its unclarified horizons’. 25  One could only imagine that Husserl 
would have been a  rather reluctant Trotskyite.  This also seems to contradict  what 
Merleau-Ponty had said, in later lectures, about stability and progress coming at a 
price. It is not the movement of institution that recuperates the sense of permanent 
revolution, but rather the activity of phenomenology itself as a safeguard against the 
Crisis.  The continuous unearthing of the total  movement of the past  threatens the 
stability of institutions in their current state. Thus phenomenology, as explained in the 
Crisis and  ‘Origin  of  Geometry’  both  explains  the  stability  of  institutions  and 
threatens that stability. Revolution must be understood here not as an effacing of the 
past, but rather as a summoning up of all the dimensions of the present in order to  
undermine the solidity or stability of the institutions of a field of praxis, and opening 
up its future possibilities of development. In comparing human and animal institution 
in the  Institution and Passivity lectures, Merleau-Ponty asks: ‘What defines human 
institution? A past which creates a question, puts it in reserve, makes a situation that is 
indefinitely open. Therefore the human is at once more connected to his past and more 
open to the future. The future by means of deepening the past.’26  But, the possibility 
of revolution, or of a revolution is of course one of the infinite possibilities opened by 
the  institution  of  consciousness—that  ‘matrix  institution’  which  opens  up  the 
possibility of the common adventure of humanity in first  place.  Revolution,  in its 
political sense then cannot be thought apart from or understood outside of the history 
of life in whose movement its very possibility first emerges as a latency held within 
the field of consciousness. As I shall touch upon in a moment, death, in turn, must be 
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understood in terms of the ceasing of the movement of life qua institution—a stability 
or inertia that is contrary to the inertia of Nature. As well, the ‘deepening’ of the past 
cannot be understood apart from the re-institution of the weight and inertia of Nature. 
It follows from this that Merleau-Ponty would consider the indefinite expansion of the 
field of praxis—‘permanent revolution’—to be the properly Marxist understanding of 
truth,  having  corrected  of  course  for  Marx’s  poor  understanding  of  Nature.  And 
indeed, Merleau-Ponty says as much in Adventures of the Dialectic when he writes: 
‘Revolution is [...] when a radical negation frees the truth of the whole past and allows 
the attempt to  recover  it.’27  ‘Truth’,  he goes on to  say,  ‘is  then conceived as  an 
indefinite  process  of  verification’.28 There  is  thus  a  revolutionary  militancy  in 
Husserl’s Rückfrage itself.29      
   
It is fitting then that the three parts of the motto of the French Republic—
Liberté,  Égalité,  Fraternité—are bound up with  the  theory of  institution.  But  we 
might do better to point to an older version of the French motto, altered due to its 
seeming association to the terror, Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité ou la morte. It is in the 
discussion of the historical, cultural,  and political dimensions of life that Merleau-
Ponty  briefly  discusses  death.  Death  appears  however  within  life  in  the  most 
paradoxical  of  manners,  as  ‘survival’.  This  compounds  the  seemingly paradoxical 
nature of death in Merleau-Ponty’s thought: death as an inertia which is contrary to 
the inertia of life, which as the reinstitution of nature, drives life’s movement; and 
death as a form of survival that is again contrary to life. 
The theme of freedom (Liberté) also repeatedly comes up in the discussions of 
institution and must be thought in terms of a structural possibility for the indefinite 
expansion of life’s field of history that emerges with the institution of consciousness. 
Thought in this way however, freedom does not emerge ex nihilo but rather has a pre-
history  in  life,  a  pre-history  that  cannot  be  disconnected  from  the  elementary 
organisation of organic matter, i.e. embryology. Brotherhood also (Fraternité) appears 
in the passage cited at the beginning of this essay (‘[institution is] accomplishment 
and brotherhood’)  and is  of  course  implied in  the ‘common adventure’ of  human 
history.  Like  freedom,  this  common  ‘adventure’ (adventure  implies  freedom  for 
Merleau-Ponty)  seemingly becomes possible  with the institution of  consciousness. 
And, as noted,  death appears in  ‘Indirect  Language and the Voices  of Silence’ as 
‘survival’ and in the wonderful analogy of the ‘museum’ as a nécropole. I have also 
related it here to an inertia or stability that is contrary to the inertia that is the re-
institution of the  Urstiftung of Nature in the movement of life. This would seem to 
leave Égalité as the outlier in the relation between the motto of the Republic and the 
theory of institution (perhaps more comfortable ground for Husserl  than Trotsky’s 
Permanent Revolution). This is not however completely the case. 
There is not space here to fully explore all of the relations, but a few remarks 
are  certainly worth  making before  touching  briefly  on  the  more  grand themes  of 
freedom, brotherhood and death. The political project that Merleau-Ponty undertakes 
concurrently with his efforts to develop the theory of institution, life, and nature that I 
have tried to sketch out above is described as a new form of liberalism, one that is not 
incompatible with the goal of socialism—equality.30  Here, Raymond Aron’s criticism 
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that Merleau-Ponty had written half of Adventures of the Dialectic as though he were 
still a Marxist, the other half presumably as a liberal, is telling. Merleau-Ponty did 
indeed still consider himself a Marxist of some sort. More specifically, he thought that 
by reading Marx together with Husserl (and Weber), he would be able to construct a 
political  philosophy that  put  the  liberal  institution  of  government  par  excellence, 
parliament, at the heart of a open-ended field of political praxis. Parliament, he said 
would be that institution that could guarantee a minimum of resistance.31  With this 
safeguard in place, the field of political praxis, rather than being the expression of 
illusory pure laws of nature understood as movement, would instead bear witness to 
the  weight  and  inertia  of  the  institution  of  Nature.  He  thus  criticised  certain 
‘proletarian’ strains  of  Marxist  philosophy of  history  as  failing  to  recognize  that 
‘everything that historically exists’ is ‘at the same time movement and inertia’. Such 
theories mistakenly placed in history, as contents, ‘on the one hand the principle of 
resistance (called the bourgeoisie) and on the other the principle of movement (called 
the proletariat), when these are the very structure of history as a passage to generality 
and to  the  institution  of  relationships  among persons.’32  Despite  Claude Lefort’s 
criticisms  that  Merleau-Ponty  did  not  fully  understand  the  significance  of 
totalitarianism,  especially  Soviet  totalitarianism,  Merleau-Ponty’s  criticism  of 
‘proletarian’ theories  of  history  would  seem to  indicate  otherwise.  Merleau-Ponty 
links the errors in Marxist theory of history to an inadequate concept of Nature in 
Marx’s own thought. Again, in his lectures on Schelling he writes: ‘Marx wants to 
ground the becoming of everything on something other than the Hegelian idea: thus 
he grounds it  in Nature,  but he makes poor use of the idea of Nature.  Instead of 
conceiving it, with Schelling, as weight and inertia, he conceives it as the same sort of 
thing  as  the  Hegelian  idea,  as  an  inexorable  destiny.’33  Parliament,  that  liberal 
institution whose modern conception cannot be separated from the equality (legal and 
political if not yet social and economic) of all citizens would in this sense safeguard 
the weight and inertia of history, and thus open-endedness of life, or more properly 
the  institutional  history  of  life  in  its  human  individuation.  Parliament  and 
parliamentary  politics  would  carry  the  trace  of  the  Urstiftung of  Nature  as  a 
watermark; and in doing so liberal politics would ensure the structural possibility of 
freedom. Thus Merleau-Ponty’s political project of articulating a new left liberalism, 
including  his  support  for  the  bourgeois  liberal  institution  of  parliament  is  not  a 
separate  political  project  to  be understood apart  from his  ontology of  Nature and 
philosophy  of  life.  Rather,  his  unfulfilled  attempts  at  developing  a  new  political 
philosophy  were  completely  intertwined  with  the  attempts  at  constructing  a  new 
‘indirect ontology’ that had to proceed through a phenomenology of life toward a 
philosophy of Nature. Nor is it the case that the ontology underpins or supports the 
political philosophy, that it is a politics grounded in an ontology. To the contrary, it is 
a politics that in a sense underpins and supports the ontology. There is thus seemingly 
a normative aspect of the phenomenology of life (insofar as it leads into ontology). 
We  already  saw  this  in  relation  to  truth  and  freedom,  both  are  reliant  on  the 
continuous movement  of  institutional  life.  The political,  and in  our  era,  Merleau-
Ponty  believed,  liberal-democratic  politics,  ensure  the  structural  possibility  of 
freedom and of truth.     
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How does the activity of such a fragile and flawed institution offer such high 
political  and  even  ontological  hopes?  Put  simply,  that  actual  concrete  activity  of 
parliament must be akin to the phenomenological Rückfrage or militant truth. Science 
is not the only domain of life that is idealised and technisized, the same is also true of 
the social realm. It is then the responsibility of parliament to continuously put into 
question the very genesis of the institutions of the social field.34  Merleau-Ponty ends 
his  essay  ‘Indirect  Language  and  the  Voices  of  Silence’ on  an  optimistic  note, 
remarking  that  if  construed  in  this  proper  manner,  i.e.  if  political  life  ‘taps  its 
spontaneous source’—the movement of life itself—it will never lack for values and 
ideas. It is worth noting that it is Husserl’s theory of institution which allows Merleau-
Ponty to create a politics that is entirely ontological and an ontology that is entirely 
political, without subordinating one to the other.   
   
The freedom of the institutional life in  the field of praxis, the freedom which 
parliament is charged with protecting, is not an ‘event based freedom which is attested 
to in a decision’.35  Insofar as an institutional history is always a conditioning of the 
future, freedom as the structural moment of institutional life must be construed as the 
very opposite of this. What sort of freedom is this then? It is the power to remake a 
history and a tradition by taking it up as a question. Freedom then can be expressed 
both actively as well as passively and need not be limited to the volitional exercise of 
a decision. The choice we make when faced with a decision is largely determined, 
freedom  would  not  have  it  any  other  way.  By  way  of  example,  Merleau-Ponty 
describes the ‘choice’ or ‘work’ of the painter in this manner. Each brush stroke upon 
the canvas is conditioned not only by all the others on the canvas, but also by the 
entire tradition that each stroke takes up as a question and recasts. Thus the work of 
the painter is absolutely prefigured—like that of the animal. But in carrying out this 
work, the painter opens an entirely new future; she changes the history of life forever 
and opens herself and others onto a field of investigation that has been irrevocably 
altered. This is why Matisse was so shocked at watching, in a slow motion film, his 
hand dance above the canvas before coming crashing down in a decisive stroke. On 
the one hand, such an image seems to dispossess Matisse of the freedom he thought 
he was exercising in choosing his stokes. But this is only the case if we take a limited 
‘events based’ view of freedom. What Matisse was witness to in the slow motion film 
was his body’s own participation in a movement that extended beyond the volitions of 
single subject. The muscles of his hand, arm, and eye were already involved in the 
sketching out of a future before Matisse himself was consciously aware of it. This is 
not a dispossession of freedom but the sign of the integration of an entire life in that 
global  movement  of  freedom which  Merleau-Ponty christens  ‘a  world’s  creation’. 
Human being is free insofar as each subject is in every gesture continuously, often 
without being conscious of it at all, sketching out the ‘creation of a world’ in terms of 
a  question  and  a  task  to  be  taken  up.  But  this  structural  moment  of  freedom is 
dependent on the referencing back, on a question offered up by the past being taken 
up.  It  is  the  weight  or  inertia  of  life  as  institutional,  and  then  of  Nature  as  the 
Urstiftung of life, that pulls consciousness back—back into its own history and into its 
pre-history. Humans are in this sense the beings closest to nature not most removed 
from it.
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It  is  in  the  structural  moment  of  freedom—the  creation  of  a  world—that 
institution is also brotherhood. It is also in this sense that loneliness is akin to death. 
The question that each life picks up and develops is a question bequeathed by others. 
And with each expressive act, each expression of our world creating freedom, we pass 
the  question  on  to  others.  This  is  what  Merleau-Ponty  means  when  he  says  that 
institution is the hinge or pivot between subjects. Fraternité is not the movement of a 
mass of bodies as one. This is the opposite of brotherhood. Brotherhood requires the 
space or interval that institution, in opening up a field of investigation or expression 
whose  contours  have  only roughly been  sketched,  provides.  Brotherhood requires 
what  Merleau-Ponty calls  the  in-between world that  is  created by institution—the 
world  in  which  life  moves  and  develops.  At  the  political  level  this  necessitates 
institutions  like  that  of  parliament,  which  not  only  maintain  the  space  between 
subjects, the space of institutional life or of expression, but also the relation to the 
past.  But  in  doing  both  of  these  things,  in  connecting  subjects  to  each  other  by 
maintaining a space between them and in demanding that the past be continuously 
revisited and taken up as a question, the institution of parliament is also an institution 
of  life.  It  staves  off  the  form of  death  that  Merleau-Ponty  refers  to  in  ‘Indirect 
Language and the  Voices  of  Silence’ as  ‘survival’.  The  life  of  the  polis must  be 
understood  here  ‘organically’ as  an  extension  of  the  life  of  the  subject  and even 
perhaps  of  the  life  of  animals.  As  not  separate  from  the  global  movement  of 
institutional life that includes both the movements of Matisse’s hand and embryology; 
it is, to paraphrase Hannah Arendt, an ‘institutional remembrance’. And it is in this 
sense that the free polis is the institution of the ‘noble memory’. The polis that does 
not continuously refer back to the totality of its own past,  taking it up again as a 
question that is constantly being reposed is—a bit hyperbolically—dead, a nécropole: 
a city of corpses.           
To say that survival = death is indeed a striking statement. Nonetheless, I think 
that this  sums up what Merleau-Ponty has in  mind in ‘Indirect  Language and the 
Voices of Silence’ when he refers to the ‘historicity of death’ and to the museum as 
nécropole. If life can be understood as a ‘noble memory’, it is then fitting that death 
be a forgetting that is actually a conservation of the past. Death in this sense is the 
survival of an institution in a static state. It is when an institution ceases to develop, to 
change, and to refer back upon its history as the motor of that change. Thus the past is 
conserved, but there is no relation to the past, no deepening of the present’s relation to 
it, and thus no opening of the future. Survival in this sense is the negation of freedom 
as a structural moment of institutional life. Hung on the wall as static moments in a 
history of  art,  the museum, Merleau-Ponty writes  ‘kills’ paintings.  It  removes the 
institution  from  both  the  movement  of  the  ‘tradition  that  it  recaptures’ and  the 
‘tradition that it founds’. In other words, the museum leaves the painting like a corpse, 
not a living, breathing expression of life. The same then can be said of the subject as 
institution.  Survival,  for  a  subject,  is  its  simple  continuation:  metabolism without 
expression—a living  corpse.  If  we  follow  Merleau-Ponty’s  reading  of  Husserl  in 
agreeing that all consciousness in its proper activity of constitution is institutional, 
then the subject that ceases to develop institutionally cannot be said to be any longer 
conscious. Survival in this sense is the death of the subject. Death,  it  seems then, 
points to the inertia of an institution, its resistance to change. But this sense of inertia
This is a draft of D. Meacham (2012) 'The Institutional Life' in eds. R. Breeur and U. Melle Life, Subjectivity, 
and Art, Essays in Honor of Rudolf Bernet. Dordrecht: Springer. Please cite only from published version.  
—the more  classical  sense—must  be  understood as  the  opposite  of  the  inertia  of 
Nature or life.       
In  Hannah Arendt’s  magnificent  study,  The Origins  of  Totalitarianism,  she 
describes the ontological correlate of totalitarianism or of terror as ‘loneliness’. This 
is in many ways, I think, an emotive formulation of the idea of death as survival. 
Loneliness  is  not  isolation  but  its  opposite,  the  crushing  of  subjects  against  one 
another such that there is no room for expression or action; in other words, no room 
for the free development of institutions and of institutional life in general. Under the 
condition of loneliness there is no possibility of movement but along tracks that have 
already been established. Life in this condition is still institutional in one sense, but it 
is  a  sphere  in  which  institutions,  including  subjects  do  not  develop,  they merely 
survive.  Arendt  connects  the condition  of  loneliness  with the  reduction of  human 
being from Homo Faber to  Animal Laborans, where human life is reduced to mere 
satisfaction  of  metabolic  needs.  There  is  a  strong  connection  here  with  Merleau-
Ponty’s investigation of animal institution. The animal leads an institutional life, but 
its paths are fixed. Citing Konrad Lorenz Merleau-Ponty notes that the imprint of an 
institution in animal life ‘exists “upon a foundation of general innate and expected 
themes”’. It is the institution of consciousness that frees human life from survival and 
opens the human into the field of historical truth. The condition of loneliness, at its 
extreme,  can  be  thought  of  as  a  life  before  the  institution  of  consciousness  qua 
freedom and truth,  i.e.  the  indeterminate  development  of  the  field  of  history and 
sense. This is the utter perversity of the ‘naturalness’ of the totalitarian regime. That 
regime which claims to establish as its ‘laws’ the immutable laws of the movement of 
nature,  is  in  fact  the  most  ‘technisized’.  What  Arendt  describes  with  the  term 
loneliness  is  the crushing of what  Merleau-Ponty calls  the in-between world,  that 
sphere of praxis and freedom that is always burdened by the weight and inertia of 
Nature.  What  is  left  behind  is  little  more  than  corpses  pressed  together  in  the 
nécropole.   
And  yet,  we  must  recall  Merleau-Ponty’s  cautious  optimism.  Survival, 
loneliness and their political correlate, terror, are the suppression of the weight and 
inertia of Nature. But Nature’s weight cannot be completely suppressed or eradicated, 
although it can perhaps be eradicated from the public sphere, from the movement of 
properly political institutions. It is not just civilisation that requires communication 
and language, the biological survival itself of human beings seems to demand it, and 
where there is communication between subjects even in its most stagnant, stratified, 
and technisized forms, there is the residue of Nature: the institutional life demands it. 
Life in this sense envelops death.      
The American writer  Toni  Morrison describes  a ghost as ‘a loneliness that 
roams’.  A ghost,  in  this  sense,  is  what  lives  but  does  not  survive;  a  principle  of 
resistance that cannot be eradicated because it belongs to the fabric of life itself. In a 
philosophy that seems filled with paradoxes, where inertia is a principle of movement, 
and survival equals death, it seems fitting that the ghost become the emblem of the 
ineradicable movement and development of life. There is no regime, no survival, and 
no institution that is not in this sense haunted by its past, haunted by the history of life 
This is a draft of D. Meacham (2012) 'The Institutional Life' in eds. R. Breeur and U. Melle Life, Subjectivity, 
and Art, Essays in Honor of Rudolf Bernet. Dordrecht: Springer. Please cite only from published version.  
in its entirety and thus by the re-institution of Nature.  The institutional life does not 
know ends, pure survival, or death, in its continuous returns to its origins it knows 
only the discovery of new directions and new beginnings.
    
1 M. Merleau-Ponty, Signs, R. McCleary (trans.) (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1964), 
p. 832 Ibid. p. 59. The sentence ‘It is accomplishment and brotherhood’ actually comes directly before, not 
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alters the sense of the phrase. 3 The next lines make it clear that in trying to describe the mode of existence of the question, Merleau-
Ponty also has the mode of ‘institution’ in mind: ‘[The] mode of existence of institution, like that of the 
reactivated “past” and “anticipated” future, is not yet a content of consciousness’, M. Merleau-Ponty, 
Institution and Passivity, Course notes from the Collège de France (1954-55), L. Lawlor and H. Massey 
(trans.) (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2010), p. 23. 4 The relation between Husserl’s phenomenology of time consciousness and Merleau-Ponty’s 
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because Merleau-Ponty is clear in The Visible and the Invisible that he develops his theory of institution 
as a critical response to Husserl’s theory of retention. Nonetheless, Husserl’s phenomenology still 
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students: ‘[The] mode of existence of institution, like that of reactivated “past” and of the “anticipated” 
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of course be a result of the Husserlian dimension of my own reading of Husserl, but I take this sentence 
to be reference to Husserl’s phenomenology of time consciousness.5 ‘The word ‘constitution’ undoubtedly has a very large meaning for Husserl, who always distinguished a constitution by acts from a “latent” constitution in, e.g. his Lectures on Internal 
Time Consciousness. Nevertheless Husserl is clearly embarrassed. In Ideas II, after having made these analyses, he adds that these are only “preparatory” analyses, prepared according to the natural attitude, and that the phenomenological analyses shall revoke the naivetés of it.’  M. 
Merleau-Ponty, Nature, D Séglard (ed.), R. Vallier (trans.) (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University 
Press, 2003), p. 796 ‘The very first of all cultural objects, and the one by which all the rest exist, is the body of the other 
person as a vehicle of a form of behavior.’ M. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, C. Smith 
(trans.)(London: Routledge, 2002), p. 406. 7 M. Merleau-Ponty, Nature, pp. 207, 213, 282. See also the discussion of instinct in these lectures: 
‘Thus a sort of reference to the non-actual, an oneiric life is manifested in these instinctive activities in 
a pure state. Even if these acts are produced most of the time by reference to an object they are all 
together something different from reference to an object, i.e., they are the manifestation of a certain 
style’ (ibid. p. 192).8 M. Merleau-Ponty, Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology, B. Bergo and L. Lawlor (eds.) 
(Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2002), p. 76 9 Merleau-Ponty, Nature, p. 167.
10 M. Merleau-Ponty, Notes des Cours au Collège de France 1958-1959 et 1960-1961, C. Lefort and 
S.  Ménasé  (eds.)  (Paris:  Gallimard,  1996),  p.  37;  the  project  that  Merleau-Ponty  announces  here 
exhibits both continuation and a radical reformulation of the one that he announces at the beginning of 
Structure of Behaviour:  ‘Our goal is to understand the relations between consciousness and nature: 
organic, psychological, or even social. By Nature we understand here a multiplicity of events bound by 
relations of causation.’ The goal remains the same, the understanding of nature has seemingly changed. 11 Merleau-Ponty, Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology, p. 7612 See, F.W.J. Schelling, Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature in Sämmtliche Werke II, 39, E.E. Harris and P. Heath (trans.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) p. 30.13 Merleau-Ponty, Nature, p. 3914 Merleau-Ponty, Nature, pp. 3-4 15 On this point—‘Nature as Abgrund that evades constituting reason’—see, for example, Rudolf Bernet, ‘Le sujet dans la nature. Réflexions sur la phénoménologie de la perception chez Merleau-
Ponty’, in M. Richir et E. Tassin (eds.), Merleau-Ponty, phénoménologie et expériences (Grenoble: Jérôme Millon, 1992), pp. 57-7716 Merleau-Ponty, Nature, p. 51;17 M. Merleau-Ponty, ‘La Nature ou le monde du silence (pages d’introduction)’ in Maurice Merleau-
Ponty, E. Saint-Aubert (ed.) (Paris: Hermann, 2008), p. 53. 18 Merleau-Ponty, Nature, p. 177.19 Merleau-Ponty, Nature, p. 208. 20 Merleau-Ponty, Nature, p. 207.21 Merleau-Ponty, Nature, p. 208.22 Merleau-Ponty, Notes de Cours 1959-61, p. 77.23 See, Merleau-Ponty, Nature, p. 178; Institution and Passivity, p. 22  24 The relations between the ‘ontological’ and ‘empirical’ dimension of history are never, I think, fully worked out by Merleau-Ponty. The concept of institution clearly brings the two together. In the Institution and Passivity lectures he introduces the idea of a ‘matrix institution’ or ‘matrix event’ which he says ‘opens a historical field that has unity. The institution is what makes a series of events possible, a historicity’, and later, ‘the institution in the strong sense is this symbolic matrix that makes it such that there is an opening of a field, of a future according to its dimensions, the possibility of a common adventure and of a history as consciousness’ (Merleau-
Ponty, Institution et Passivité, pp. 44-45). The emergence of consciousness and subjectivity would 
obviously be such a ‘matrix institution’ in all of these senses. The idea of consciousness as a ‘matrix 
institution’ not only brings together the empirical (both in the case of the first emergence of 
consciousness and each individual birth) and the ontological, but also brings together the ontological 
dimension together with a ‘biological’ one that is precisely the life history that precedes the institution 
of consciousness.       25 Merleau-Ponty, Institution and Passivity, p. ??26 Merleau-Ponty, Institution and Passivity, p. 2227 M. Merleau-Ponty, Adventures of the Dialectic, J. Bien (trans.)(Evanston, IL: Northwestern 
University Press,1974), p. 40.28 Merleau-Ponty, Adventures of the Dialectic, p. 5329 ‘The militant truth, the one that puts constituted idealities and ready-made language in question and wants to discover outside of every “technique”—technization—the very genesis of ideality, is philosophy’ (Merleau-Ponty, Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology, p. 66)   30 Of course, the root concept of all liberal theory is the equality of men, even if social and economic equality are not necessarily posited as its goals. 31 The parliamentary politics of this ‘new liberalism’ would still be placed at the service of the ‘public 
interest’, and I take Merleau-Ponty to mean by this ensuring equality: ‘Its essential feature is that the 
entire economic and political operation be put to the service of the public interest, whatever means are 
employed; and this means not necessarily nationalizations as we have known them nor the methods 
used in Russia after the revolution […] I do not think that nationalizations must be excluded, but only 
that they must not have an a priori privilege. ’ M. Merleau-Ponty, Parcours Deux, J. Prunair (ed.) 
(Lagrasse: Verdier, 2000), p. 245 32 Merleau-Ponty, Adventures of the Dialectic, p. 22133 Merleau-Ponty, Nature, p. 5134 In the last lines of ‘Indirect Language’ Merleau-Ponty writes: ‘Political thought [...] is always the elucidation of an historical perception in which all our understandings, all our experiences, and all our values simultaneously come into play—and of which our theses are only a schematic formulation. All action and knowledge which do not go through this elaboration and which seek to set up values which have not been embodied in our individual or collective history (or—what comes down to the same thing—which seeks to choose by means of a calculus or wholly technical process) fall short of the problems we are trying to solve’ (Merleau-Ponty, Signs, p. 83).   35 Merleau-Ponty, Nature, p. 178.
